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Summary 
China is going through extraordinary economical growth. China’s leaders must balance 
growing energy demands with the ability to guarantee security in the shipping lanes. Most of 
the oil Chinese industry depends on comes from Africa and the Middle East. The fastest route 
from Africa and the Middle East to China is through the Straits of Malacca. The Straits of 
Malacca are the most trafficked sea route in Asia and one of the most important shipping 
lanes in the world. The Straits of Malacca are narrow and heavily trafficked. China has 
invested in one of the largest military modernizations in the world to be able to protect 
Chinese trade and shipping against piracy in the Straits and the possibility of blockades 
conducted by other countries. China is also trying to find additional ways to transport natural 
resources. One possibility is to transport resources through Burma. Burma is considered to be 
the most strategically important country in Southeast Asia and the neighbouring countries are 
unwilling to let China gain total control over Burma. India in particular is worried that China 
might gain too much power in the Indian Ocean if China is allowed to develop and use ports 
and naval bases in Burma. As China is also claiming almost the entire South China Sea, the 
Southeast Asian countries fear that they may become encircled by Chinese forces. To prevent 
this scenario, the Southeast Asian countries have the choice to either ally with China and let 
China become the hegemonic power in the region, or to ally with the U.S. or India to hedge 
against Chinese influence and balance the power in the region.         
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1. Introduction  
The aim of this thesis is to see how China is becoming a major player on the global stage and 
how this will affect China’s relationship with its neighbours. China is one of the main 
supporters of the Burmese military rule and has ways of building Chinese controlled ports and 
naval bases in Burma
1
. The other countries around the Indian Ocean and in Southeast Asia 
will have different reactions to Chinese expansion in the region and the strategic situation in 
Southeast Asia will be affected by this. Richard A. Bitzinger writes that “Southeast Asia can, 
paradoxically, be regarded as a zone of both relative calm and of relative insecurity”2. There 
are no open wars in the region, nor are there areas of severe tension, like in the Taiwan Strait 
or at the border between North and South Korea, where there are possibilities of future major 
conflicts or wars. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN
3
), a geopolitical and 
economic organization consisting of most of the Southeast Asian states, also serves as a 
medium to keep the peace between the Southeast Asian states and to keep the strategic 
situation stable. However, the Southeast Asian region has some of the world’s most 
strategically important sea lines of communication (SLOCs). Some of these SLOCs, like the 
Straits of Malacca, are natural bottlenecks. If they are blocked they can cause major 
economical crisis, especially to the East Asian and Northeast Asian markets. The East China 
Sea, The South China Sea and the Bay of Bengal are areas of great interest to the littoral 
states, because of the natural resources like fish, oil and gas that can be found there. There are 
several disputes over islands in the South China Sea between China and the Southeast Asian 
countries. There are also several illegal cross-border activities and much ethnic tension in 
Southeast Asia. Refugees and rebels from Burma are frequently crossing the border into 
Thailand. Burma is also the second largest producer of illicit opium in the world. Opium and 
other drugs, like methamphetamine and heroin, spread from Burma through the region and to 
the rest of the world
4
. Cambodia and Thailand have had several disputes over areas where the 
                                                     
1
 I choose to use Burma even though the official name of the state is Myanmar. I choose to do this because 
Myanmar is a name invented by the Burmese military junta.  However, I will not change the name in quotes.  
2
 Bitzinger, Richard A., The China Syndrome: Chinese Military Modernization and the Rearming of Southeast 
Asia,  http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/WorkingPapers/WP126.pdf , 2007, accessed 01.02.11, p. 1 
3
 The members of ASEAN: Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Burma/Myanmar, 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. http://www.aseansec.org/18619.htm   
4
  CIA, “Burma”, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bm.html accessed: 16.03.11 
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boundary markers are lost
5
, and fighting between Thai and Cambodian armed forces started 
again on 22 April 2011 around Ta Krabey temple and seven soldiers were reported killed. 
This area was given to Cambodia by an international court in 1962, but is still claimed by 
Thailand. The two countries also had border clashes in February 2011 over an area 200 km 
west of the 900-year-old Preah Vihear temple
6
. Thailand also has problems concerning 
separatist violence at the Malaysian border. The southern provinces of Thailand have a 
predominantly Muslim population, of which several want independence from Thailand
7
. 
Human trafficking is also a major problem in Southeast Asia. Men, women, and children are 
sold across borders as slaves. Men are mostly used as forced labour, while women and 
children are used in commercial sexual exploitation, domestic servitude, and as forced 
labour
8
. 
The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) formally established 
what coastal states can claim as their territorial sea. According to UNCLOS, every state has 
territorial rights to its adjacent waters up to a limit of 12 nautical miles. Every state also has 
the rights to the air space over these waters and the bed and subsoil under it. These territorial 
rights also cover islands
9
, which is one of the reasons why states claim sovereignty over 
strategically placed islands outside their 12-nautical-miles limit from their coasts. In seas and 
oceans which are rich on natural resources states will gain larger parts of these resources if 
they gain the sovereignty of these islands.    
The UN also defines an exclusive economic zone as: “an area beyond and adjacent to the 
territorial sea”10. The costal state has in its exclusive economic zone the  
                                                     
5
 CIA, “Cambodia”, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cb.html accessed: 
16.03.11 
6
  BBC, “Thailand and Cambodia clash again along border” http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-
13173906, accessed: 23.04.11. 
7
 CIA, “Malaysia” https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/my.html, accessed: 
16.03.11  
8
 CIA, “Burma”, accessed: 16.03.11 
9
 UN, “United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea”  
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/part2.html accessed: 10.03.11 
10
 UN, “United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea”  
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/part5.htm accessed: 10.03.11 
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“sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and 
managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters 
superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil, and with regard to other 
activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the 
production of energy from the water, currents and winds”11. 
The extension of an exclusive economic zone is measured in the same way as territorial sea. 
Exclusive economic zones, however, can extend up to 200 nautical miles from the costal state. 
The costal state shall provide jurisdiction in its exclusive economic zone, but the UN also 
states that other countries have, among other rights, freedom to navigate through and fly over 
these zones
12
.  
China’s expansion of power and how they project it are interesting topics which should be 
studied and monitored closely. As China’s economy is growing China needs to become more 
engaged in world politics to secure interests and access to natural resources. Robert D. Kaplan 
writes that the Chinese government wants stability in the countries it is engaged, and therefore 
do not care about or demand change in countries ruled by dictators. He claims that China is 
more likely than the western world to gain access to natural resources in certain African and 
Asian countries because China cares little about what type of regime they trade with
13
. 
Clifford Shelton shares this view with Kaplan and states that “China is obtaining access to 
African oil in large part by providing investment without political conditions”14. Even though 
the ruling of the military junta has resulted in ethnic tension in Burma, the Chinese 
government prefer the military junta to stay in power in Burma
15
. China does not want the 
                                                     
11
 UN, “United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea”, part 5, accessed: 10.03.11 
12
 UN, “United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea”, part 5, accessed: 10.03.11 
13
 Kaplan, Robert D., 2010, “The Geography of Chinese Power, How Far Can Beijing Reach on Land and at 
Sea” , p. 24 
14
 Shelton, Clifford, 2008, “The Energy Component of China’s Africa Strategy”, p. 186 
15
 China, however, is not the only country which supports dictators to preserve regime stability and stability in 
certain regions. Before Husni Mubarak lost the power in Egypt, he controlled the justice system, the universities, 
the media, the military and the religious institutions. He also placed his closest supporters in important key 
positions. Mubarak and his regime were supported by the U.S. Several of the regimes in the Middle East have 
survived for a long time partly due to the support from the US and other western countries. The largest known 
deposits of oil and gas are found in the Middle East and several of the countries are strategically important to the 
West. The U.S. and the West are the regimes external protectors and in return the regimes controls and suppress 
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opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi, who won the last free, democratic election in Burma, to 
gain her rightful place as leader of a democratic Burma. Beijing fears she will be a natural ally 
of the U.S. and the West and “add to China’s own long-standing fears of strategic 
encirclement by the U.S. and its allies”16.  
The countries bordering Burma and the Indian Ocean, feel threatened by China’s growing 
strategic interest in expansion into the Indian Ocean. Burma holds a strategically important 
geo-political, -economical and -military position in Southeast Asia and China wants to use 
Burma as a means to reach the Indian Ocean. It is vital to the Chinese economic growth that 
Chinese shipping is granted free passage through the different SLOCs.   
This thesis will also discuss China’s naval expansion into the East China Sea, South China 
Sea and the Pacific Ocean, the interaction with Japanese and ASEAN naval forces and the 
disputes over the natural resources in the East China Sea and the South China Sea. China’s 
need to assert its claims over this region, has grown as fast and steadily as the Chinese 
economy. In the Pacific Ocean, especially, China will encounter the U.S. Navy. The U.S. 
Navy has had decades defending the role of global super power, a role which China seeks to 
establish for itself. It will be interesting to see if China in the future can draw from U.S. 
experience in dealing with reluctant allies, or if China chooses to make its own political and 
diplomatic way and mistakes.   
 
1.2 Chinas historical relationship with Burma 
South China and Burma have a long history of cultural and economical ties. Trade flourished 
across, what is today, the border area between the two countries. During the period of Chinese 
division from the Han to the Tang dynasty, today’s Yunnan province was influenced by the 
Burmese form of Buddhism, Hinayana Buddhism. The northern part of Burma was for a time 
part of the South Chinese kingdom of Nanzhao which was probably ruled by people of Tai 
origin. Nanzhao was one of the six small kingdoms which formed in the west and central parts 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Islamic extremist groups which have the will and the means to attack western targets. Selvik and Stenslie, 2007, 
pp. 86-87, 170-171. 
16
 Selth, Andrew, Burma’s China Connection and the Indian Ocean Region,  
http://rspas.anu.edu.au/papers/sdsc/wp/wp_sdsc_377.pdf published: 09.2003, accessed: 10.04.11,  p. 8 
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of Yunnan. Nanzhao grew in power and conquered the five other neighbouring kingdoms. As 
a client state of the Tang dynasty, Nanzhao was allowed to rise and expand. However, in 751 
(A.D.) Tang forces were sent against Nanzhao after their forces raided Chinese settlers in 
eastern Yunnan. Nanzhao won the battle and the An Lushan rebellion in Tang China 
prevented another Tang military intervention against Nanzhao. Although Nanzhao remained 
independent until the late Song period, it lost its Burmese areas in the 880s. According to J. A. 
G. Roberts the Burmese area was too difficult for the Nanzhao forces to defend, and the 
failure to conquer all of Sichuan led to a further weakening of the Nanzhao forces. In the late 
13
th
 century Nanzhao was, together with most of Southeast Asia, conquered by the Mongols
17
. 
Other parts of Burma were ruled by the Pyu people who came to Burma in the 7
th
 century. 
The Pyu established city kingdoms at Binnaka, Mongamo, Sri Ksetra and Halingyi, which 
became a part of a trade route between China and India
18
.      
Through series of conquests the Mongols occupied the Chinese world and established the 
Yuan dynasty in 1272. The last remnant of Southern Song was not captured before they 
capitulated in 1279. North China is quite flat and was easily conquer by mounted cavalry. 
South China and mainland Southeast Asia, however, is mountainous and more difficult to 
navigate with large troops on horses. The Song naval power was also a formidable adversary. 
The Mongols conquered Korea, the Pagan dynasty of Burma and most Southeast Asian 
countries, then turned west and defeated the Muslim world. During the Yuan dynasty there 
was much cultural exchange across old borders as travellers could move safely between the 
different areas and regions under Mongol rule
19
. The Burmese Pagan (Bagan) dynasty was 
established by 849. The kingdom developed around the city of Pagan and grew steadily in 
power and size. King Anawrahta managed to unify all the areas which present-day Burma 
consists of by defeating the Mon city of Thaton in 1057. The Pagan king Narathihapate 
(reigned 1254-87) advanced into Yunnan in 1277 to attack the advancing Mongol forces. The 
Pagan forces were defeated at the Battle of Ngasaunggyan and after that the Pagan resistance 
                                                     
17
 Roberts, J. A. G., A History of China, Prehistory to c. 1800, 1996, pp. 110-111 
18
 “Periodical history of Myanmar”, www.myanmars.net/myanmar-history/myanmar-periodical-history.htm 
accessed: 22.04.11 
19
 Roberts, A History of China, Prehistory to c. 1800, pp. 163-175 
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collapsed
20
. King Narathihapate felt that his kingdom and leadership were strong enough to 
go against the Mongols, but the Pagans had not managed to unite all the different ethnic 
groups in their territory. Without the sense of unity the Pagan defence disintegrated quickly 
before the superior Mongol forces
21
. All of present-day Burma was united again under the 
Konbaung dynasty. King Alaungpaya regained control over Manipur in 1759 and established 
his capital at Rangoon. His son, king Hsinbyushin (Sinbyushin, Sinpyushin), continued the 
expansion of the kingdom and conquered Ayutthaya, parts of Siam, the Shan states, Laos and 
Chiang Mai (the capital of the kingdom of Lan Na). This expansion and unrest at the southern 
border worried the Manchu Qing dynasty in China. Between 1766 and 1769 the Qing emperor 
Qianlong sent four expeditions to Burma to conquer the state, but all four were successfully 
defeated by the Konbaung forces. In 1769 a treaty that opened for official trade and 
diplomatic relations was signed by Burma and China
22
. 
 According to John K. Fairbank, all of the small states in East Asia developed inside an area 
heavily influenced by Chinese culture, making China the natural centre of East Asia. China 
was “all-under-Heaven” and the Chinese emperor was “son of Heaven”. Cultures and people 
outside of China were categorized after how similar they were to China, but none were 
considered as important and civilized as “all-under-Heaven”23. Being the natural centre of 
East Asia, it was considered natural to receive tributes from lesser states and people. In 1818 
the Qing emperor expected to receive tributes from Siam once in three years, while Laos and 
Burma had to pay tributes once in ten years
24
. However, Burma’s successful defence against 
the Qing forces ensured that Burma stayed independent and that the tributes were only 
formalities.      
 
                                                     
20
 Myanmar Net, “Periodical history of Myanmar”,  www.myanmars.net/myanmar-history/myanmar-periodical-
history.htm accessed: 22.04.11 
21
 Global Security, “Myanmar”,  http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/myanmar/intro.htm , accessed: 
01.04.11 
22
 Myanmar Net, “King Sinphyushin”, www.myanmars.net/myanmar-history/king-sinphyushin.htm accessed: 
22.04.11 
23
 Fairbank, John K., The Chinese World Order: Traditional China’s Foreign Relations, 1968, pp. 1-2 
24
 Fairbank, The Chinese World Order, p. 11 
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1.3 Guomindang and the early Burmese state 
As Melvin Gurtov writes, Burma’s long border with China and the historical relationship 
between the two countries have lead Rangoon to develop China-oriented politics. Burma has 
since the independence from Great Britain in January 1948 known the possibility of Chinese 
interference in political and military matters
25
. Burma had friendly relations with the 
Nationalist regime in Nanking. The Nationalists had supported Burma’s entry into the United 
Nations
26
. However, when the Chinese Communists defeated the Guomindang and large parts 
of the Nationalist forces fled to Taiwan or crossed the border into northern Burma in the 
period 1949-1950, Burma did not help these forces. These Guomindang Chinese settled in the 
Shan States of northern Burma where they organized and ran several drug operations
27
. The 
Burmese government was worried that Communist China might invade Burma to remove the 
threat that the Guomindang soldiers presented to the Yunnan province.   
 
1.4 Burma and Communist China 
Marxism started to influence the Burmese nationalists in the 1930s at the time the anti-
colonial view in Burma started to gain more support. However, the Burmese Communist 
Party (BCP) did not manage to gain power in Burma and the first independent government of 
Burma did not develop close relations with Communist China even though it was the first 
Asian government to recognize the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 194928. When the 
Government of the Union of Burma (GUB) developed the state’s foreign policy in 1948, the 
first plan was to have close relationship with both the Western and the Eastern bloc. Burma’s 
policy of establishing friendly relations with all countries was to signal that “Burma would 
reject any foreign aid that might compromise her military, political, or economic 
                                                     
25
 Gurtov, Melvin, China and Southeast Asia- The Politics of Survival. A Study of Foreign Policy Interaction, 
1975, p. 83 
26
 Gurtov, China and Southeast Asia- The Politics of Survival, p. 89 
27
 Seekins, Donald M., The Geopolitics and Economics of Burma’s Military Regime, 1962-2007. Understanding 
SPDC Tyranny,  http://japanfocus.org/products/topdf/2573, 2007, accessed 12.11.07, p. 7  
28
 Gurtov, China and Southeast Asia- The Politics of Survival, pp. 83, 85, 90 
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independence”29. However, the Western bloc were little enthusiastic about an ally with ties to 
both sides and when the Communists took over the power in China, Burma settled for being 
politically neutral.    
Like modern Burma’s first leader, U Nu, the military regime led by General Ne Win did not 
adopt friendly relations with either China or India. China openly supported the BCP which 
opposed the military government, and both India and China supported several ethnic groups 
who rebelled against the military regime. However, China quickly offered support to the 
military group, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), when they took 
power in Burma in 1988, following the brutal suppression of demonstrations against military 
rule
30
. The border area between Burma and China is home to some of the major ethnic armed 
groups which oppose the military rule in Burma. These groups include the United Wa State 
Army (UWSA), Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) and National Democratic Alliance 
Army (NDAA). The Burmese military junta has tried to make these groups agree to become 
border guards, but have not been able to do so. In August 2009 the military junta attacked the 
Myanmar National Democratic Alliance (the Kokang Group). The Kokang Groups are ethnic 
Chinese and over 20 000 fled into China
31
.   
 
2. Method and theory 
The method of this thesis will be analysis of foreign affairs embedded in a historical context.  
Kenneth N. Waltz wrote that “Countries that are dependent on others in important respects 
work to limit or lessen their dependence if they can reasonably hope to do so” 32. Being 
dependent on other countries may challenge the security of the state. Economic failure or 
threats to the security of one country will inevitably affect countries which are closely linked 
through trade and defence to that particular state. Waltz states that “How much a country will 
                                                     
29
 Gurtov, China and Southeast Asia- The Politics of Survival, pp. 87-88 
30
 Tellis, Ashley, “China and India in Asia”, 2004, p. 151 
31
 Kuppuswamy, C.S., “Sino-Myanmar Relations and its impact on the Region”, 
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers44/paper4357.html published: 02.03.11, accessed: 10.05.11 
32
 Waltz, Kenneth N., Theory of International Politics, 1979, pp 154-155 
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suffer depends roughly on how much of its business is done abroad”33. However, some states 
have no other choice than to be dependent on other states for survival and other states want to 
play major parts in the global economy. These states have to do most, or a large part, of their 
business abroad while trying not to become too dependent on others. To lessen the threats, 
states who are strong enough will work to gain as much control as they can over their 
international relations. Growing economy means growing demand for energy supplies and 
very few states are capable of being independent when it comes to energy supply. This, Waltz 
argues, is something only the strongest and most capable industrial states may think of 
becoming
34
. China is one of the countries whose industrial and economic growths are 
dependent on foreign energy supplies. 
Kenneth N. Waltz’s branch thought in the school of realism has been analysed by Liu Feng 
and Zhang Ruizhuang as “defensive realism (which) should be classified as structural 
realism
35
, as both emphasize the international system and its structural restrictions on the 
behaviour of states”36. According to Waltz, the international structure limits the way states 
develop their behaviour. This structure causes states with similar levels of power to develop 
the same way and to behave in the same manner in politics and foreign relations. Liu and 
Zhang write that there are few examples where the international structure can be used and 
manipulated so that a state can develop a unique foreign policy or foreign behaviour
37
. 
According to this theory rising powers will project power and behave in much the same way. 
Comparing the earlier development of other great powers, like Britain and the United States, 
to that of China today there can be found similarities in the behaviour of the states. Projecting 
power far away from its own borders to raise the state’s level of political and economical 
security is one of the most obvious similarities. The projection of power also serves to protect 
SLOCs. Britain was dependent on goods shipped from the colonies to secure the economical 
                                                     
33
 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 154 
34
 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 155 
35
 Realism as a school of thought can be divided into several strands and branches, however, these strands and 
branches still share several similarities which can make the differences between them hard to define.   
36
 Liu Feng and Zhang Ruizhuang, The Typologies of Realism,  http://cjip.oxfordjournals.org/content/1/1/109.full 
2006,  accessed: 09.03.11, p.5 
37
 Liu and Zhang, The Typologies of Realism, p. 5  
  
14 
growth, the U.S. is dependent on steady oil supplies to its industries like China has recently 
become.  
According to Liu and Zhang, one of the most known branches in realism is the distinction 
between offensive and defensive realism
38
. This fraction is based on how and why states use 
power. Some scholars argue that states use power to secure their own existence. These 
scholars are called defensive realists and claim that “power is a tool for achieving a goal, not a 
goal in itself”39. Others argue that states use power to gain more power, these are called 
offensive realists
40. According to the defensive realists China’s power projection, military 
modernization and expansion of influence are only means to secure the survival of the 
Chinese state. The offensive realists, however, sees this as a means to gain more power in the 
region and the world. By asserting its power and military might China may gain power over 
its neighbours, and as its control over East and Southeast Asia grows China can spread its 
influence to larger parts of the world. Even though Liu and Zhang classify Waltz as a 
defensive realist, Waltz claims that “realism is not offensive or defensive - all states use 
numerous means to preserve their existence. The use of an offensive or a defensive strategy is 
always determined by the specific context”. Waltz acknowledges that states will use power to 
expand their power when they can
41
.               
By understanding the context of the Chinese economical development and security concerns 
one can more easily grasp some of Chinas underlying principles and concerns in connection 
with Chinese projection of power and military modernization. Robert D. Kaplan writes about 
how China wants to have access to secure ports throughout the Indian Ocean. China’s 
growing demand for energy and natural resources has led to growing trade with African and 
Middle Eastern countries. Roads and energy pipelines through Burma would make the 
transport of oil and minerals traded from Africa shorter, easier, and safer. This route would 
also make sure that the Chinese merchant fleet can avoid going through the Straits of 
                                                     
38
 Liu and Zhang, The Typologies of Realism, p. 6  
39
 Liu and Zhang, The Typologies of Realism, p. 6  
40
 Liu and Zhang, The Typologies of Realism, p. 6 
41
 Liu and Zhang, The Typologies of Realism, p. 7 
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Malacca. Burma is also rich in natural resources, and India and China are competing for, 
among other things, access to Burma’s gas fields in the Indian Ocean42.     
The U.S. has been the only super power in the world since the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union. However, China is rapidly gaining power in the East and Southeast Asian regions, and 
India is also having great influence in the development of those regions. Between the three 
economic giants; the U.S., China, and India, Asia has become a multipolar region. According 
to Kenneth N. Waltz is a multipolar system of three powers unstable and easy to change back 
to a bipolar system. Two of the powers will most likely ally against the third and reduce its 
power. He also claims that a multipolar system of four powers will be more stable
43
. As the 
economic relations within ASEAN grow stronger, ASEAN will also gain more power in the 
region and possibly become the fourth power in Asia. In a system of three, the U.S. and India 
are most likely to ally against China.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
42
 Kaplan, Robert D., “The Geography of Chinese Power, How Far Can Beijing Reach on Land and at Sea”, 
2010, p. 24 
43
 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 163 
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3.  Challenges to the strategic situation in Southeast Asia 
Most of China’s border disputes with Central Asian republics and with Russia from the Cold 
War have now been settled. On 12 January 2011 the parliament in Tajikistan formally voted 
to cede over 386 square miles of land to China, the largest investor in Tajikistan. The details 
of the treaty are not known, but according to China this settlement “thoroughly resolved the 
border dispute”. Not much is known about the land which was ceded to China, but it is 
located in the Pamir mountain range. The Pamir mountain range forms part of the border 
between Tajikistan and China and Afghanistan
44
. With most military threats on land settled, 
China can now use more resources on building a stronger navy. Even though China has a long 
shoreline to the east, it has traditionally been a continental power with limited or almost non-
existent naval power. Today, however, China has the largest naval force in Asia. In addition 
to modern warships and submarines, China has a large number of landing crafts which can be 
used for ship-to-shore operations. China has also a large civilian fleet of fishing boats and 
cargo vessels which can be used as supportive troop transport to the naval amphibious fleet
45
.   
 
3.1.1 The development of Chinese naval power. 
Going back to the Ming dynasty (1368-1644) we find that China has earlier been active in the 
Indian Ocean. The early Ming emperors wanted to restore China to the glory of Han and Tang 
dynasties and the tribute system which confirmed China’s role as rightful ruler of East Asia. 
The third emperor of the Ming dynasty, Chengzu, sent emissaries and explorers further out 
than earlier emperors to find new tribute states. Between the years 1405 and 1433 the Ming 
emperor sent out several Chinese flotillas, the first was made up of 27 000 men, 62 large ships 
and 225 smaller ships. Some of the expeditions went to India, others as far as the Persian Gulf 
and the east coast of Africa. The most famous of these expeditions were commanded by the 
eunuch official Zheng He. The plans to enrol these foreign places into the tribute system were 
given up by later emperors when they were convinced by court officials that they were not 
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cost-efficient
46
. During the 16
th
 century, however, Ming dynasty China went from being an 
outward turned country with great maritime expeditions to have a more continental turned 
view. Ming China kept a large part of its commercial fleet, but the interest in trade diminished 
as China was self sufficient. Several laws regulating the size and the use of he ships were 
imposed. Among these laws was one that made it illegal to build ships with more than two 
masts, other laws called for imprisonment of people conducting overseas trade
47
.  
 
The Cold War 
When the Communists won the civil war in China, the capitalistic United States became a 
political and ideological opponent and was seen as a threat to China. Originally, Roosevelt 
wanted China to take over the leading role in East Asia from Japan after the Second World 
War
48
. Beijing made the natural choice at the time and turned to Soviet for protection against 
the US threat. Already in 1949, Mao suspected that the U.S. would send armed forces against 
China. The Communist party were told by him that the U.S. would likely send forces to 
coastal cities in China to occupy them and fight the Chinese forces there. Mao was also 
convinced that there were other areas that the U.S. was likely to send its forces to attack 
China. During the 1950s and the 1960s, the Chinese Communist Party thought it most likely 
to be in the areas of the Korean peninsula, the Taiwan Strait and in Indochina that the Chinese 
and the U.S. armed forces would face each other
49.The People’s Liberation Army Navy 
PLAN) and the Soviet Navy cooperated closely in the first decade after the Chinese 
revolution. Soviet sent naval advisers and instructors to China to help establish and develop a 
modern Chinese Navy. Soviet also sent modern ships to replace the fleet which the 
communists acquired from the Guomindang Navy
50
. In 1958, the Soviet Minister of Defence, 
Radion I. Malinovskii, suggested to Mao that Soviet and China should build a powerful long-
wave radio station together where money and technology would be provided by the Soviet 
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Union. This radio station would link the Chinese Navy and the Soviet Navy, uniting the two 
nations in the defence of the Far East. Together the two nations would be more than capable 
of deterring and hindering the U.S. as the growing superpower in the Pacific Ocean. The 
Soviet Union also suggested that the two navies should be joined to establish one Far East 
Navy
51
. Mao, however, was reluctant to establish a closer relationship with the Soviet Union. 
He believed that the Soviet Union sought to dominate and control the relationship and that 
China would be used in the defence system as the Soviet Union saw fit. Mao wanted China to 
rise and become a great world power in its own right and not to be dependent on the Soviet 
Union. The deepening distrust, border disputes and Nikita Khrushchev’s negative reaction to 
the Chinese bombing of the Jinmen and Mazu Islands in 1958, led to tension between China 
and Soviet at the end of the decade and the final Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s
52
. The tension 
escalated into clashes between Soviet and Chinese armed forces at the Amur River in 1969. 
The Jinmen and Mazu Islands came under Nationalist Chinese control when they escaped 
from the Communists in mainland China to Taiwan. Some of the Jinmen Islands are no 
further than 24 km from the Chinese mainland and were periodically shelled by Chinese 
artillery. In 1958 the heavy bombardment of the islands and the demand from Communist 
China that the Nationalists on Taiwan should surrender led to international interest in the 
conflict. The U.S. sent the 7
th
 Fleet to the Taiwan Strait to monitor and control the situation
53
. 
According to Shu Guang Zhang the bombardment was never meant to be a start of an 
invasion of Taiwan, but it was a show of strength. Shu writes that “by initiating limited and 
well controlled crises, Beijing expected to clearly demonstrate China’s resolve to counter 
international pressure” and that China would fight U.S. influence in the region and the Taiwan 
Strait
54
. After the Korean War China needed to show the international community that the 
Chinese were ready and capable to defend themselves. Mao and the Communist party were 
afraid the Korean War was a prelude to a U.S. led invasion of China. In 1960 the Soviet 
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withdrew all its advisors from China and stopped sending supplies and new technology
55
. 
This was a major turning point for PLAN. 1960 marked the moment when the Chinese started 
their own development of a modern navy instead of receiving and copying Soviet ships and 
technology.  
Early in the Cold War the Chinese Navy did not extend its operations and mobility far from 
its mainland coast. Using parts of the Soviet Naval doctrine, the Chinese naval defence 
strategy consisted of keeping a large number of coastal submarines, torpedo boats and other 
vessels capable of “brown-water” operations close to its shores. These vessels were supported 
by land based aircrafts. The doctrine of large number of vessels kept in close, passive defence 
has been called a “wall-at-sea”56. The sheer number of vessels was supposed to deter and 
hinder any naval attack. The CCP relied on a doctrine of superiority through numbers. The 
revolutionary movement adopted the slogan “People’s War” early in the civil war and kept 
focus on this through the Cold War. Human power was seen as the main asset to defeat any 
invader. The Chinese defence strategy developed according to Mao’s principles; the People’s 
Liberation Army was to let invaders conquer several coastal cities for so to be “lured in 
deep”57, lured into unfamiliar territory, where they would be defeated by the much larger, but 
technologically weaker, Chinese army. During the 1970s the foreign policy changed and a 
new doctrine was formed. Technology was given a larger part in the new defence program: 
“People’s war under modern conditions”. However, human power was still seen as the 
winning factor and even though PLAN wanted modernizations the armed forces strategy was 
to “rely on active defence on the home territory”58. PLAN eventually gained support for its 
modernization plans. During the 1980s PLAN developed some green-water capabilities and 
higher standard in education of personnel and technical equipment
59
.   
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1990-2011 –Modernization and rearmament  
Through the period of 1990-2011 China shifted to a more aggressive navalism. The 
geopolitical changes in East Asia after the Cold War enabled the Chinese government to shift 
focus to the sea. The Chinese government has poured resources into increasing and 
modernizing China’s maritime capabilities. In 2007 the official Chinese defence budget was 
350 billion yuan (U.S. $45 billion), almost 18 per cent more than the Chinese defence budget 
of 2006
60. According to Ronald O’Rourke, specialist in Naval Affairs, some observers of 
Chinese naval affairs believe that one incident which directly resulted in acceleration of the 
Chinese modernization was when the U.S. sent two aircraft carrier strike groups to Taiwan 
after China tested missiles close to Taiwan in 1996
61
.  
China needs a more skilled navy to claim and dominate its ideal sphere of influence. While 
China develops its naval capabilities, the world watches and speculates at the outcome. When 
Kenneth N. Waltz wrote about the amount of GNP countries were spending on military 
modernization in 1979, he also commented that  
“Some have worried that the People’s Republic of China may follow such a path, that 
it may mobilize the nation in order to increase production rapidly while 
simultaneously acquiring a large and modern military capability. It is doubtful that 
she can do either, and surely not both, and surely not the second without the first. As a 
future superpower, the People’s Republic of China is dimly discernible on a horizon 
too distant to make speculation worthwhile”62.  
A report from 2000 stated that “China may take a more active military role in its region, but 
the overall balance of power in East Asia will remain unchallenged”. The report also stated 
that it would take “a significant amount of time” for China to be able to develop and integrate 
new weapons systems
63
. In 2001 Greg Austin and Stuart Harris wrote that most members of 
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the Japanese government believed that it would take several years, “possibly decades, before 
China has an effective blue-water naval capability about which Japan needs to be 
concerned”64. Nine years later, in June 2010, the Chairman of the U.S. Joints Chiefs of Staff, 
Admiral Michael Mullen, stated that “I have moved from being curious to being genuinely 
concerned” when he described his view on the development of the Chinese military 
programs
65. China’s naval modernization program involves all parts of the navy, from weapon 
acquisition programs, missiles and mines to different kinds of ships, naval doctrine and 
logistics. There is also focus on changing the education of the personnel and how they train. 
Of special concern to the U.S. Navy, is the belief of the U.S. Department of Defense that 
China is developing and testing anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM). With the additional 
development of proper maritime surveillance and targeting systems, China would be able to 
attack U.S. Navy ships or U.S. allies operating in the Western Pacific
66
. The speed in which 
China has managed to organize and start the modernization of its armed forces has surprised 
not only its neighbouring countries, but also countries with modern and powerful armed 
forces.     
With no immediate threats from neighbouring countries, China has in reality no direct need 
for the enormous military machine it has built up and continues to expand. Neither has China 
a direct use of most of its growing navy in brown and green water (rivers and coastal-water) 
defensive matters. The smaller ships are useful in countering smuggling and terrorist threats 
close to shore, but the aircraft carriers and most of the submarines are designed and developed 
for blue water operations. This is a clear indication on China’s plans of asserting their claimed 
rights overseas and to be able to protect the Chinese merchant fleet along the Chinese SLOCs.   
From 2001 to 2005 China invested in one of the largest military modernizations in the world. 
The modernization included 23 new amphibious assault ships. The amphibious assault ships 
are designed to carry tanks, armoured vehicles and troops. These domestically-produced ships 
are capable of crossing the Taiwan Strait
67
. PLAN has also put great effort into building a 
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significant submarine force. PLAN has acquired 12 Russian-made Kilo-class non-nuclear-
powered attack submarines since the mid-1990s and built four new classes of Chinese 
submarines. The U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence stated in 2009 that “since the mid-1990s, 
the PRC has emphasized the submarine force as one of the primary thrusts of its military 
modernization effort”68. In 1998 China bought an unfinished aircraft carrier from Ukraine. It 
is believed that the ship will be completed to enter service as an aviation training ship or for 
operational missions in 2011 or 2012. China may also have started the construction of its first 
indigenous aircraft carrier and may build a total of six indigenous carriers in the next 10-15 
years
69
. As Taiwan is within reach of land-based Chinese aircrafts, observers believe that the 
aircraft carriers are build primarily for power-projection operations against smaller naval 
forces
70
. Since the early 1990s China has developed and deployed five new classes of 
indigenous built destroyers and four new classes of frigates, also indigenous developed and 
built. The aim is to produce surface combatants with advanced anti-air warfare capabilities, 
which has “historically been a weakness of the (Chinese) fleet”71. China has also developed 
types of amphibious ships with a hull with clean, sloped sides which are anticipated to 
decrease the ship’s visibility to radar in conflict scenarios. Amphibious ships can also be used 
in disaster relief operations, maritime security operations and evacuations
72
. 
 
PLAN’s limits and weaknesses  
Even if China has a large navy, it does not mean China knows, yet, how to employ and 
operate it to maximum effect. High numbers in ships statistics does not give an indication on 
how China operates its fleet. Even though the Chinese Navy started to change its doctrine 
more than 20 years ago it has not had an opportunity to test the execution of that doctrine. 
China showed after the earthquake in Sichuan in 2008 and during the recent ethnic unrest in 
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Tibet and Xinjiang that the People’s Liberation Army73 is capable of moving large troops fast 
and a long way to respond to trouble
74
. However, as Kaplan refers to Abraham Denmark, this 
only shows that PLA is highly capable of moving personnel; it does not show whether China 
is capable of moving heavy machinery or maintaining supply lines which is crucial during 
military deployment
75
. In such an event China must also be able to defend its personnel from 
counter attacks and even though China has the largest army and navy in the region it does not 
mean that China employs the superior strategy. A country with a smaller army and navy, but 
with better strategy and which has had time to develop and test its military and naval doctrine 
may well be able to withstand a possible Chinese attack.     
  
Future plans of PLAN   
China is determined to maintain its access to regional and worldwide shipping lanes and to be 
able to support its claims of sovereignty in the East and South China Sea. The U.S. 
Department of Defense also believe that the Chinese naval modernization is a part of a 
military strategy to solve the situation with Taiwan
76
.  
PLAN has to develop and modernize enough to be able to protect Chinese ships against 
submarine attacks, not only oil and gas tankers but also transport, fishing and trade ships. A 
PLAN goal would be to be able to control the maritime traffic in Chinese coastal waters and 
the areas China claim as territorial waters. Enhancing the combat capability of PLAN’s fleet 
of submarines will most likely be a priority. Submarines would be the main focus for 
developing a competent defence and attack force, especially against possible blockades of 
SLOCs. The presence of PLAN in the South China Sea might be a security for the Chinese 
SLOC through the Straits of Malacca, but it will also encourage further modernization and 
rearmament of the Southeast Asian navies, with the possibility of creating an arms race in the 
region.  
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The total amount of PLAN ships will most likely go down (see appendix) but the new ships 
will have greater technological strength and improved operational effectiveness. PLAN is also 
mostly commissioning indigenous build ships, limiting the dependency on foreign 
technology.   
 
3.1.2 Why China needs Burma  
China has one of the fastest growing economies in the world. In the late 1970s China slowly 
started to change from centrally planned economy to the marked-oriented economy that today 
makes China one of the major forces in the global economy. Some of the greatest changes 
came in the years before 2001, when China became a member of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). To be able to compete with other member countries on the global 
marked, China’s agricultural economy had to go through several reforms77. In 2010 China 
became the world’s largest exporter of goods78. According to Goldman Sachs, the Chinese 
economy will surpass the U.S. economy by 2027 if the current economic growth continues
79
. 
To be able to maintain this growth, China is dependent on reliable sources of energy. In 2008 
China was the second largest producer of electricity in the world, 3.451 trillion kWh 
(estimated), surpassed only by the United States, 3.873 trillion kWh (estimated). Much of this 
energy is produced by China’s own coal mining. China has low oil or natural gas reserves, but 
the Chinese coal reserves are estimated to last for another 100-200 years. Coal is the cheapest 
and easiest resource for covering most of the demands for energy from the fast-growing 
Chinese industry
80
. However, not all energy demands can be covered by coal, the severe 
pollution caused by coal mining has been recognised by the Chinese government, and China 
is becoming more and more dependent on oil. In 2009 it was estimated that China produced 
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3.991 million bbl/day (barrels a day), the world’s fifth highest oil producer. In 2008 it was 
estimated that China used 8.2 million bbl/day and exported 388 000 bbl/day. To cover the 
demand for oil in 2008, China had to import 4.393 million bbl/day
81
. Outside interference in 
the import of oil will have severe consequences for the Chinese industry and economy. The 
outward drive for access to natural resources is going to increase and thus the problems and 
security dilemmas connected to the SLOCs will have greater impact on Chinese foreign 
policy.    
While the U.S. and other Western countries import oil from the Middle East and other oil-
countries supported by the West, China has developed relationships with oil-countries like 
Sudan, Iran, and Burma; countries which have been “isolated by Washington”82. The oil from 
Africa and Iran is shipped along the SLOC through the Straits of Malacca.   
 
The Straits of Malacca 
The Straits of Malacca is the most trafficked sea route in Asia and one of the most important 
SLOCs in the world. Over 60 000 vessels, almost half the world’s operative fleet, go through 
the straits every year
83
. Situated between Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, it is 
the shortest sea route to transport supplies and goods between Africa, The Persian Gulf and 
the Indian Ocean and the Asian markets.  
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Figure 1: The Strait of Malacca and the littoral states 
It is possible for goods and supplies to be shipped through other Indonesian straits, but these 
are longer routes and will cost more time and money, slowing down the supply lines. In case 
of a blockade of the Straits of Malacca, tankers may reroute through the Lombok Strait. This 
route would take the tankers almost 3.5 days more of sailing. A larger blockade of the whole 
region would require the tankers to go around Australia which would take 16 days more of 
sailing. These routes will also increase the expenses of shipping
84
. At the narrowest point, 
between Sumatra and Singapore, the Straits of Malacca is no wider than 3 km, and has only a 
depth of 25 metres at the shallowest point. The heavy traffic in the narrow channel creates 
dangers of groundings, collisions and oil spills. Another danger is the threat of piracy. Due to 
the low speed tankers and other merchant vessels must keep through the Phillips Channel of 
the Straits of Malacca, pirate vessels have many opportunities to attack and hijack them as 
they navigate through the bottleneck
85
.    
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The security in the Straits of Malacca was further questioned when videos showing Malaysian 
police patrols in the Straits were found at terrorist groups belonging to the Al-Qaeda network. 
The importance of the Malacca Straits makes it extremely vulnerable to terrorist attacks. In 
2004 there were suggestions that the U.S. Navy could help patrol the Straits to deter terrorists, 
showing that also the U.S. has strategic interest in the channel. Malaysia and Indonesia 
opposed the idea of a unit of U.S. Marines based in and patrolling the straits, stating that the 
littoral states were capable of organizing and performing the operations necessary for 
maintaining the security in the straits themselves. Singapore, however, is a close ally of the 
U.S. and was the country which proposed the idea at the International Conference on Asia
86
.  
China is highly dependent on the security in the Malacca Straits. However, when the U.S. 
Navy suggested a joint task force to protect the Straits from terrorists and pirates, China was 
one of the countries which had negative responses to the U.S. The U.S Navy is one of the 
greatest sea powers in the world today, and is theoretically capable of blocking China’s access 
to the South China Sea and the Straits of Malacca and strong enough to enforce the blockade 
if China decides to test the barriers. PLAN is not yet strong enough nor has the skills 
necessary to protect China’s interests in those waterways. The U.S. Navy has previously 
executed three naval blockades in Asia, against Japan, Korea and Vietnam, and will have the 
advantage over China which has not had the experience with modern-warfare blockades
87
. 
The potential threat a more permanent U.S. Navy in the South China Sea poses to the free 
flow of commerce to China is more alarming to the Chinese government than the threat of 
terrorism and piracy in the Straits of Malacca, even though Chinese naval writings stated that 
in 2001 alone there were over 600 piracy incidents in the Straits of Malacca
88
. 
 
In August 2005 the Foreign Ministers of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore met in Batam, 
Indonesia. The three states came to an agreement called “The Batam Joint Ministerial 
Statement”, which reaffirms the sovereignty and the sovereign rights the littoral states have in 
the Straits. The Statement also states that the security and the protection of the Straits are the 
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prime responsibility of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, but the three states also recognises 
and acknowledges the interests of other states in the Straits. The littoral states also stated that 
the use of the Straits must be according to international law, including the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea
89
.   
In September 2007 the Cooperative Mechanism for the Straits of Malacca and the Singapore 
Straits was launched by the littoral states with the support of the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO). The Cooperative Mechanism was established to secure the further 
cooperation between the littoral states and other users of the Straits regarding the overall 
security in the Straits, safety of navigation and environmental protection
90
. The littoral states 
and IMO also started an “Aids to Navigation Found” (the Found) with specific projects 
connected to the Straits of Malacca. The different projects were designed to increase security 
in the Straits and to help protect the environment. States which use the Straits contribute to the 
Found. The projects include setting up tide, current and wind measurement systems, 
cooperation and capacity building in relation to the OPRC-HNS Protocol
91
, and replacement 
of aids to navigation damaged in the 2004 tsunami. Several countries have donated money to 
the Found, to specific projects or to the Found in general. Among the donators are Japan, the 
Republic of Korea, the United Arab Emirates, Greece and China. The U.S. and Australia are 
also interested in contributing to specific projects. Beijing has stated that China will found the 
replacement of all aids to navigation damaged in 2004
92
. By being a major stakeholder in the 
Straits, China has made sure it will be more difficult for the littoral states to justify a 
peacetime blockade against China in the Straits. The major Chinese involvement in co-
development projects in the Straits also ensures China greater influence on politics in the 
littoral states. The willingness to cooperate and participate in the projects helps to establish an 
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image of stability and peace for China and further enhance China’s diplomatic relations in the 
region.   
Due to its situation at the southern end of the Malacca Straits, Singapore is one of the busiest 
and most important ports in the world. Singapore fears the Chinese expansion of power and 
has tried to take precautions against Chinese influence. Singapore has a military training 
program with Taiwan and has a close friendship with the U.S. The government of Singapore 
wants the presence of both U.S. military and U.S. diplomats in the region
93. The U.S. Navy’s 
western logistics base is situated in Singapore and Singapore has built a pier for U.S. carriers 
at Changi Naval Base
94
. The U.S. can by presence in Singapore alone control the Straits of 
Malacca. Disregarding the wishes of Indonesia and Malaysia, U.S. Navy ships based in 
Singapore can maintain security and control of the narrowest point of the Straits. This 
situation is highly unwanted by Indonesia and Malaysia, who wish to project power and 
independence, and China, who fears that the U.S. Navy will block the Straits of Malacca for 
Chinese ships and threaten this Chinese SLOC. China is trying to find other ways to transport 
goods and oil to China. One of the suggestions has been to modernize the infrastructure in and 
to build pipelines through Burma. This route would enable China to avoid the Straits of 
Malacca. China National Petrolium Corporation (CNPC) started in June 2010 the construction 
of a dual oil and gas pipeline from the Burmese west coast to the Yunnan Province. China is 
also developing a deep sea port at Kyauk Phyu from where China will channel the oil and gas 
to Yunnan
95
.   
 
3.2 Does Burma need China? 
Burma’s location at the entrance to the Straits of Malacca and it’s coastline towards Bay of 
Bengal and the Andaman Sea makes Burma one of the most strategically important countries 
in Southeast Asia. As a country of several different ethnic groups, Burma has gone through a 
turbulent time marked by domestic ethnic tension since the independence from Great Britain. 
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The military dictatorship has also led to tension in Burma’s international relations. While the 
Burmese generals want Burma to be more or less free of interference from great powers 
guarantees Burma’s geographically position that the country has become a part of the Indian-
Chinese competition for strategic control of Southeast Asia. Burma has not tried to control the 
entrance to the Straits of Malacca on its own, but a more powerful ally with bases in Burma 
will have strategic advantages over the SLOC.         
In June 1989, Aung San Suu Kyi, the leader of Burma’s National League for Democracy 
(NLD) appealed to the world community to stop all foreign aid and stop doing business with 
the Burmese government. The Burmese government, SLORC, survived on foreign aid and 
used it to suppress the democratic movement. Through the 1990s, the Western led boycott of 
Burma had some success. The United States had been Burma’s fourth largest investor, but in 
1997 the U.S together with the European Union tried to prevent ASEAN from including 
Burma in the organization and to participate in boycott. The Western boycott of Burma did 
not lead to a significant change of regime. SLORC was replaced by the State Peace and 
Development Council (SPDC), which was in reality only a change of name, not in the way of 
ruling. Burma was, however, accepted into ASEAN, which has a policy of not interfering 
with the internal ruling of other member countries. The European Union answered with more 
trade restrictions and the U.S. imposed an investment ban. This investment ban was to make 
sure that no new U.S. companies invested in the military regime and its violations of human 
rights
96
.  
The Western boycott of Burma has little effect today. The SPDC have trade relations with the 
other ASEAN countries and Burma is one of the countries in Southeast Asia with most natural 
resources, like teak and natural gas. Japan was in 2007 the largest donor of official 
development assistance to Burma, sharing the ASEAN view that economic relations and 
investment are the best ways to open the Burmese dictatorship to further dialogue. India 
originally sided with the Western countries against Burma, but then opened dialogue and 
economic relations with the SLORC to hinder China in gaining too much influence over and 
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strategic advantages in Burma
97
. Since the military coup in 1988 Burma has been rearming 
and expanding its armed forces. Most of the new ships, like patrol crafts and corvettes, and 
weapons systems are acquired from China
98
.   
The Burmese government knows the disadvantages of becoming too dependent on China, or 
on any other more powerful state. However, how much Burma is dependent on China and 
how much China controls Burma are frequently discussed by politicians and scholars. 
According to Andrew Selth, three different schools of thought can be identified on the matter 
of Chinese relationship with Burma. The first school, which he calls the Domination School, 
is strong in India, the U.S. and Australia and argues that weaker countries inevitably will be 
dominated and controlled by larger and stronger neighbours, basing this view on the Cold 
War geopolitics. According to this school of thought, China has achieved control over Burma 
through loans, massive arms sales, and regional trade and will use Burma as a means to 
surround and control India, the Straits of Malacca and the SLOCs through the Indian Ocean. 
By relying on China, Burma will no longer need the support and economical relations with 
ASEAN
99
. The second school, called the Partnership School, agrees with some of the main 
arguments of the Domination Schools, but believes that China and Burma will over time 
develop a strategic alliance and military relationship. They also believe that China will not 
take control over Burma, but that the close cooperation will lead the SPDC to perhaps “one 
day grant the PLA permanent facilities in Burma” and that the U.S. demands for change will 
bring Burma closer to China faster than a natural development
100
. The third school, called the 
Rejectionist School, consist according to Selth of “scholars with a specialised knowledge of 
Burma, and Sinologists sceptical of China’s purportedly expansionist designs”101. They 
believe that Burma is not dominated by China and will continue to be independent and have 
full control of their own politics. The Rejectionists base their view on three main points. The 
first is that Burma did not have a close relationship with China until the Western led sanctions 
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started and therefore had to cooperate more closely with China not by choice but from 
necessity. Burma is focused on staying independent and safeguarding its territorial 
sovereignty. They claim that even though China has contributed greatly to the development of 
Burmese economy and military, Burma is capable of resisting Chinese hopes of developing 
permanent Chinese military bases in Burma. They also believe that Burma will model its 
future development of government and economy on other member states of ASEAN. The 
second point is that China has never been able to completely influence Burma and make 
Rangoon do what Beijing wants. Burma is more likely to turn to other countries, like India, 
Russia and ASEAN countries, for arms acquisitions and other goods than having to meet 
demands following trade with China. The third point is that Burma is fully capable of 
withdrawing from an alliance with China if China tries to demand too much of Burma. The 
relationship with China might be ideal for Burma right now, but there are several other states 
which are interested in developing a closer relationship with Burma should Burma choose to 
draw back from China
102. As Kenneth N. Waltz states: “In multipolar systems there are too 
many powers to permit any of them to draw clear and fixed lines between allies and 
adversaries and too few to keep the effects of defection low”103. Southeast Asia has become 
multipolar; India, China, ASEAN, and the U.S. are all competing for power, control and 
influence in the region. When several powers compete for allies within one area, less 
powerful countries can manoeuvre between the different alliances to the one where they gain 
most advantages.  
According to Selth it can be said that it is Burma, not China, who has control over the 
relationship. Selth, a follower of his own so-called Rejectionist School, argues that the 
military government in Burma early realised the importance of their own geo-strategic 
position and is continually manoeuvring their political relationship from one neighbouring 
state to another
104
. By manipulating their foreign relations the Burmese military government 
has made sure that it has not become dependent on one powerful state without the ability to 
control its own territorial sovereignty. Burma balances its relationship between its two power-
growing neighbours, India and China, to make sure one country cannot completely impose 
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their influence on Burmese politics and development. The Indian-Chinese competition over 
Burma has served in Burmese favour, since the development of infrastructure, trade and 
military supports given by the two larger powers have benefitted Burma more than both India 
and China. Burma also uses its membership in ASEAN to counter the influence from India 
and China. Burma’s largest trading partner is Thailand, with India as second and China on 
third
105
. As according to Kenneth N. Waltz’s theory: Burma works to limit or lessen its 
dependence because it can reasonably hope to do so. However, the main reason why the 
military has been able to maintain control in Burma since 1988 has been Chinese support and 
protection. If Burma had been without support from China there is reason to believe that the 
generals would have succumbed to the international pressure to let the democratic movement 
grow. Burma can therefore not totally escape the rising Chinese influence in the region 
without committing to an alliance with adversaries to Chinese hegemony. It is believed that 
China is currently engaged in over 62 known hydro, oil, gas and mining projects in Burma. 
China is also constructing airports, roads, and telecommunication in Burma. There are more 
than two million Chinese nationals living legitimately in Burma, there are also large, 
unknown numbers of Chinese nationals living in the border area
106
.                
  
3.2.1 Chinese Bases in Burma  
Whether or not China actually has naval bases in Burma is also discussed by media, 
politicians and scholars. The issues surrounding the discussion on the level of Chinese 
engagement in Burma divides all groups studying the region. Selth and the followers of the 
Rejectionist thinking claim they believe the military regime in Burma when it assures that 
“permanent Chinese military bases will never be permitted in Burma”107, and that Burmese 
claims that there are no Chinese military or naval bases in Burma are “simply been dismissed 
as untrue”108. In 2009 an Indian news channel reported that the Indian government had 
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discussed the reports of Chinese maritime bases in Burma with the Burmese government. 
According to this news channel Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief of the Eastern Naval 
Command, Vice Admiral Anup Singh, stated after the meetings that “There is no report of any 
Chinese movement in our waters in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands” and “We have had a 
dialogue with the Myanmar government which has clarified there is no Chinese presence in 
Coco Islands”109. Harsh V. Pant, writing for The Japan Times, claims that China is highly 
interested in developing bases along the SLOCs and is quite capable of starting building 
processes. Pant writes that “For some time now, China’s expansionist behaviour has been 
evident. China has been acquiring naval bases along crucial “choke points” in the Indian 
Ocean not only to serve its economic interests but also to enhance its strategic presence in the 
region”110. Pant also refers to a statement made by Professor Shen Dingli, at Fudan University 
in Shanghai, on the issue of Chinese bases abroad. Introduced by Pant as “one of the most 
prominent foreign policy thinkers in China” Shen Dingli argues that China has rights to set up 
bases abroad to prevent other states from blocking Chinese trade routes. Shen Dingli also 
states that Chinese bases will “promote regional and global stability”111.  
Ashley J. Tellis states that Burma “is unlikely to give up its identity and independence merely 
to assist China to encircle India”112. Burma has no pressing security problems with India 
which would lead Burma to accept a close military and defence alliance with China for 
protection. Reports of major development of infrastructure, ports and harbours in Burma 
financed by China are frequently published and discussed. Some have evidence that China has 
already developed bases in Burma, others confirm that China has plans to start building bases. 
Dan Blumenthal writes that  
“Many observers, in India especially, believe that the grand prize in China’s 
relationship with Burma has been the construction of ports and bases along the Indian 
Ocean coast, including a major base at Hainggyi Island. The fact that this base can 
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port ships larger than anything in the Burmese fleet has not gone unnoticed by 
India”113.  
Selth writes that the first time the possibility of Chinese bases in Burma was discussed 
publicly was when a delegation from the Burmese Foreign Ministry visited New Delhi in 
August 1992
114
. The new, close relationship between China and Burma worried India. As 
China supported Burmese junta with provisions of military supplies and equipment it was 
believed that Chinese involvement in development of bases in Burma would be the next 
natural step in the military relationship. The relationship between India and China is 
influenced by Burma as a security dilemma, and by the assumptions and expectations of what 
the other states motives in Burma are.    
                                                     
113
 Blumenthal, “Concerns with Respect to China’s Energy Policy”, p. 425 
114
 Selth, Chinese Military Bases in Burma, p. 4 
  
36 
 
Figure 2: The Burmese coast line  
According to Selth Great Coco Island and Hainggyi Island in the Irrawaddy Delta are two of 
the first places thought to be sites where China developed strategic naval bases in Burma. On 
Great Coco Island China had supposedly built a large signals intelligence collection station
115
. 
Great Coco Island is situated in the Andaman Sea close to the Andaman Islands, which 
belong to India, and holds a strategic position at the entrance to the Straits of Malacca. Other 
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reports have stated that there are bases built at the Ramree Island off the Arkan coast, at 
Monkey Point in Rangoon and on Zadetkyi Kyun off the Kra Peninsula
116
. Bases off the Kra 
Peninsula would be even more ideal for controlling the traffic in the Straits of Malacca. Bases 
along the Indian Ocean coast would give China several strategic advantages. China would be 
able to monitor the movement, tests and operations of the Indian Navy in the Bay of Bengal 
and the Indian Ocean, the movement of U.S. Navy ships on the way to the Arabian Sea to 
support U.S. troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, and to control the traffic in and out of the Straits 
of Malacca. However, bases in Burma and along the Andaman Sea would also impose 
security risks for both China and Burma. The other countries which transport goods along the 
SLOC will feel threatened by the permanent presence of PLAN at the entrance to the Straits 
of Malacca. Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore will be encircled by Chinese naval forces and 
might decide to commit to closer alliances with the U.S. The bases will be far from the main 
concentration of Chinese military force and will be next to impossible to defend against an 
alliance of the Indian Navy and the U.S. Navy
117
.   
Blumenthal acknowledges the dispute among scholars on how much influence China has had 
on the construction on intelligence facilities and ports in Burma, but he has little doubt that 
China will seek to use Burmese ports as a means to reach the Indian Ocean. He writes that 
China hopes to transport oil and gas through Burma and by this bypass the security risks in 
the Straits of Malacca. However, the development and construction of oil and gas pipes 
through Burma will cost a lot of money and there are limits to how much the proposed 
pipelines can carry. The demand for energy resources will also grow beyond the limits of the 
pipelines, and the transport from the Yunnan province to the designated areas will also be 
very expensive
118
.    
Sittwe is one of the cities often pointed out as a potential port for Chinese ships in Burma. 
Situated on an island not far from the border to Bangladesh the city would be an ideal part of 
the “String of Pearls”. However, in 2010 there were reports that the Indian founded 
multinational conglomerate corporation Essar Group had signed a contract with the Indian 
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Ministry of External Affairs for the construction of two jetties at Sittwe and Paletwa. The 
project, called the “Kaladan Multi Modal Transit Transport Project”, is designed to facilitate 
for cargo movement on the river Kaladan. The Essar Project will also be responsible for 
constructing a port at Sittwe and dredging and construction of cargo barges along the river. 
According to India, the reason of the development along the Kaladan River is to transport 
goods from mainland India to the North-Eastern states of India more easily
119
.   
It must be noted that it is strange that scholars, politicians and diplomats in today’s highly 
developed technological society cannot agree on whether China has bases in Burma or not. 
All sides are equally unrelenting in their argumentation for their theoretical views, spreading 
tension through speculations.    
 
3.3 China’s relationship with India: China in the Indian Ocean 
The relationship between the modern states of India and China has long been marked by 
rivalry, hostilities and border disputes. The first Prime Minister of modern India, Jawaharlal 
Nehru, stated that the borders set by the British were realizations of the areas that India had 
historical claim to. In Chinese maps from 1950, however, land claimed by India is depicted as 
Chinese. In 1954 Indian diplomats in Beijing was assured by Zhou Enlai that these maps were 
drawn much earlier by the Nationalists and that Communist China would not claim to have 
rights to this land. However, in 1955 Indian troops met Chinese soldiers at Bara Hoti in the 
Garwhal district in the northern Indian state Uttar Pradesh. The continuously disagreements 
and China’s refusal to withdraw led to the start of first modern Sino-Indian border war in 
1962. The war lasted only about a month, but Indian forces were severely beaten. The 
Chinese declared a unilateral cease-fire and started to withdraw parts of the Chinese occupied 
land, but remained in around 14 500 square miles of territory in Arunachal Pradesh, an area in 
the mountain range on the border between China, India and Bhutan. The disagreements over 
the issue of the territorial rights to Arunachal Pradesh still cause tension
 
between India and 
China. There are several other issues concerning the border area between India and China. 
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India is concerned about China’s interest in Bhutan and Nepal and China long refusal to 
accept India’s incorporation of the Kingdom of Sikkim, a Himalayan state situated between 
Tibet, Bhutan, India and Nepal
120
.  
China’s growing strategic interest in the Indian Ocean is worrying to India, as China is India’s 
most likely competitor for strategic interests in South and Southeast Asia. The relationship 
between India and China has a direct influence on Southeast Asia and the political 
development there. India has founded a new “Look East” policy concerning Southeast 
Asia
121
. Southeast Asia has historically been the meeting point for Indian and Chinese culture 
and influence. Most of the Southeast Asian kingdoms had some form of tributary relationship 
with imperial China and some were considered a part of the Chinese defence system. China 
still sees the areas bordering to the southern Chinese provinces as its defensive perimeter
122
. 
The Chinese government is also worried about India’s hegemony in South Asia and the Indian 
Ocean. India’s navy can prevent Chinese merchant vessels and gas and oil tankers from 
reaching China with energy supplies vital to the Chinese industry. To secure the shipping 
lanes which China depends on, stretching from Africa to China, China seeks to secure rights 
to develop bases in countries which do not oppose the idea of having the Chinese Navy in 
their home waters. This network of bases and ports stretching from southern China to the 
Middle East has been named “String of Pearls” in the United States123. Secure ports all the 
way along the SLOC will enable the Chinese to send more tankers and other vessels more 
often. As China has paid for the upgrading of the Gwadar port in Pakistan
124, the “String of 
Pearls” theory and a maritime encirclement of India seems more and more likely to become a 
reality than to remain a theoretic security concern. To be able to control the current power-
balance in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean, India has no other choice than to follow and 
match Chinese military and naval modernization. It is then likely to assume that Pakistan will 
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feel threatened and less secure by India’s growing military and naval capabilities and answer 
with modernization of its own military and naval forces. Pakistan will most likely seek closer 
relationship and cooperation with China, forcing India to respond with further armament. 
Without proper dialogue and diplomatic relations this would lead to further escalation of the 
tension in Southeast Asia.   
 
Figure 3: Map over the “String of Pearls”  
However, according to Billy Tea, writing for Asia Times online, the “String of Pearls” theory 
was coined by experts at the United States-based consultancy Booz Allen Hamilton and used 
by journalists to “overplay China’s supposedly malevolent involvement with countries along 
its Sea Lines of Communication”125. James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, on the other 
hand, write that “the “String of Pearls” concept does help to explain China’s pattern of 
behaviour in the Indian Ocean”, and that both Burma and Pakistan has granted basing rights 
to China
126
. 
While India is interested in blocking China from entering South Asia and the Indian Ocean, 
Pakistan is developing a closer relationship with China. Diplomatic relations between 
Pakistan and the People’s Republic of China developed early and they continue to show an 
allied front against India. In exchange for land in the Hunza region, Pakistan officially 
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recognized Chinese claims to 5180 square km in Northern Kashmir and Ladakh, which are by 
most other states acknowledged as Indian territories
127
.  
China also formed a “strategic partnership” with Bangladesh when modern Bangladesh 
formed. Smaller and less powerful than Pakistan, Bangladesh is the inferior part in the 
Bangladesh-Chinese relationship. While Bangladesh has developed its own navy, it is highly 
dependent on supplies and technology from China. This relationship ensures that China is 
quite likely to gain Chittagong as a port in the “String of Pearls”128 and creates more pressure 
on India. With ports controlled by the Chinese on both sides, India will face the challenge of a 
more active Chinese merchant fleet and oil tankers and the possibility of a permanent 
presence of the Chinese Navy. However, several of the ports believed to be a part of the future 
“String of Pearls” require a lot of work and modernization before they are capable of 
servicing the amount and scale of the Chinese merchant fleet and the Chinese Navy. 
Any development of Chinese bases in Burma and other neighbouring countries will be closely 
observed by India. India fears that if China manages to secure its interest in the East and the 
South China Sea China will turn more focus on the SLOC in the Indian Ocean and the Bay of 
Bengal. However, it is unlikely that China will send large parts of its navy to the Indian Ocean 
before the tension and the disputes in the East China Sea and the South China Sea have been 
settled or at least lowered. The strong presence of the U.S. Navy in these areas and its alliance 
with Taiwan and Japan ensures that China will keep most of its naval forces occupied with the 
possible defence of Chinese home waters. It is not strategically sound to send forces away to 
project power while believing the greatest threat to state security is positioned just off the 
coast. India will always have the greatest strategic advantage in the Indian Ocean for obvious 
reasons, and there will most likely never come to a direct confrontation between the Indian 
Navy and PLAN in the Indian Ocean
129
. The U.S. military and naval base in the Indian 
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Ocean, Diego Garcia
130
, can with its strategic position support the Indian Navy and cause 
problems for Chinese shipping. 
There are also claims that China does not view India as a major threat and security concern. 
Cai Penghong writes that China sees India as an ally in keeping the SLOCs running from the 
Middle East to East Asia safe and that the U.S is viewed as the greatest threat to stability in 
Southeast Asia
131
.  
 
3.4. China’s relationship with ASEAN and ASEAN countries  
Melvin Gurtov commented in 1971 that “if Southeast Asia is to be a sphere of restraint for the 
major powers, it is the United States and not China which most needs to curb its imperial 
zeal”132. Today it might seem that the U.S. is needed in Southeast Asia to help balance against 
the rise of Chinese power and influence. ASEAN is described by Mark Beeson as a “product 
of the geopolitical circumstances” during the cold War133. As the region was the stage for the 
“hot” wars during the Cold War, and the U.S. and the Soviet Union competed for terretory 
and resources in Asia, the countries of Southeast Asia banded togheter for security and 
economic stability.   
The dialogue for a closer relationship between China and ASEAN started in 1991 at the 24
th
 
ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, when the Foreign Minister of the People’s Republic of China 
attended the meeting as a guest of the Malaysian Government. Since 1991 several agreements 
and treaties between ASEAN and China have been developed and signed. Trade between the 
two “blocks” has been increasing, and despite a decline in 2009 China is ASEAN’s largest 
trading partner
134
.  
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ASEAN rearmament and military modernization 
The countries of Southeast Asia have since the 1990s made extensive modernizations to their 
armed forces. Starting at the same time as the Chinese rearmament, Richard A. Bitzinger 
argues, however, that China is not the most important reason for the rearmament of the 
ASEAN countries. Bitzinger claims there are other external and internal reasons for the 
ASEAN countries to modernize their armed forces
135
. Two of the most important tasks of the 
Indonesian navy are to protect the country’s Exclusive Economic Zone and the protection of 
the long maritime borders of the Indonesian archipelago. To be able to perform these tasks 
sufficiently, the Indonesian navy is retiring its many East German frigates and corvettes and 
replacing them with modern and better ships
136
. According to John Garofano, Indonesian 
military leaders have identified China as Indonesia’s “greatest military threat” with Chinese 
claims to the Natuna Islands and the possible energy reserves there, but they are unwilling to 
support an alliance against China because of the strong trade between the two countries
137
. 
Malaysia has since 2001 increased its cooperation with the U.S. both in military, naval and 
economic matters, but has also a close relationship with China
138
. Malaysia is also 
modernizing its navy. The Malaysian navy has plans to acquire submarines, and has sent 
personnel overseas for training so they will be prepared when they receive the submarines. 
Malaysia is restructuring its entire system of naval operations and one of the main goals is to 
acquire blue-water capabilities
139
. An upgraded navy will make joint operations with allies 
more easy and make Malaysia able to project power in its territorial waters.      
Thailand has been described as “a major non-NATO ally” by the U.S., but has close 
diplomatic and economic ties with China. Thailand criticizes Taiwan and Falun Gong, two of 
China’s most problematic political issues, and most important to the U.S.; Thailand offered 
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little support or understanding concerning the most recent U.S. invasion of Iraq
140
. The Royal 
Thai Navy (RTN) is a basic asset in Thai security. Thailand’s naval build-up is aimed at, 
among other things, protection of maritime interests, littoral security, counter-terrorism and 
counter illegal trafficking. RTN required in 2007-8 two new frigates from the United 
Kingdom and missile-carrying offshore patrol vessels from China. Thailand also operates the 
only aircraft carrier in Southeast Asia. However, as aircraft carriers are quite expensive to 
operate it is rarely employed
141
.  
The Philippines is also described as “a major non-NATO ally” by the U.S. The Philippines 
had three clashes with China over islands in the South China Sea in the 1990s, and after 
realising the Philippine Navy was too weak to support Philippine claims in the area, the 
Philippine government signed military agreements with the U.S. in 1998 and 2003
142
. 
As the relationship between Vietnam and China gets worse, the relationship between Vietnam 
and the U.S. is slowly improving. One of the latest clashes between Vietnam and China 
happened in 2005 when some Vietnamese fishermen sailed into Chinese waters and China 
forcefully detained them. Vietnam supports the presence of U.S. military and naval forces in 
Southeast Asia
143
. Because of the bad relationship between Vietnam and China, Vietnam is 
willing to ally with other great powers against Chinese expansionism and influence. The 
Vietnamese Navy is tasked with protecting Vietnamese interests in the South China Sea from 
further Chinese expansion and has started a major build-up of its forces. By 2007 Vietnam 
had acquired three new corvettes, a dozen fast-attack craft patrol vessels and commissioned 
40 new indigenous offshore patrol vessels
144
.     
Singapore’s vulnerable location and lack of strategic depth on land has made Singapore focus 
on expanding its naval capabilities and acquire technological advantages. Singapore has, as 
mentioned above, close military cooperation with the U.S. and are continuously upgrading its 
naval forces. The Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN) acquired six new frigates, based on 
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French design, bought four submarines from Sweden, and commissioned the construction of 
two indigenously built landing ships in 2007
145
.  
Garofano writes that most Southeast Asian countries are not interested in allying against 
China and hedge against its influence
146
. A stable relationship between ASEAN and China 
will benefit both of the groups. It will enhance security and stability in the region and 
encourage even more trade between the two groups. Stability in the region will also ensure the 
survival and continuation of the existing regimes. The liberal theorists claim that China will 
be able to rise as a global superpower peacefully. As the world is focused on economic 
development, the other major economic powers will realize that they will benefit from 
incorporating China into their economic relations. Unlike the realists the liberalists believe 
that the drive for economic rise will lead to cooperation and stability. The realists believe that 
as each state strive to secure its own development, there will be aggressive encounters and 
that the U.S., India, and the ASEAN countries will try to hedge against Chinese expansion
147
. 
Robert D. Kaplan writes that ASEAN countries are working more closely together to lessen 
Chinese influence in the region and that “the more self-reliant these states can become, the 
less threatened they will be by China’s rise”148. The realist Jack Levy classifies this as a 
balance-of-power view within the international system. According to Levy’s distinction of the 
balance-of-power view, Liu and Zhang
149
 write that “When a great power acquires a 
predominant position in the international system, other powers will typically ally to balance 
against it”150. According to this view the ASEAN countries will ally to hinder China in 
gaining too much power in the Southeast Asian region. The ASEAN countries are likely to 
resist becoming too influenced by China and to continue asserting their own rights and 
interests, choosing to remain in contact with, but not controlled by, China. However, China 
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might claim to be threatened by the rise of ASEAN and its member countries. Close 
cooperation between the ASEAN littoral states to the Straits of Malacca and the South China 
Sea might threaten the Chinese SLOCs through Southeast Asia and lead to even more tension 
between China and ASEAN over these areas.  One of the main points of disagreement 
between the countries of ASEAN and China today is the ownership of the South China Sea. 
Almost every country in Southeast Asia claims large parts of the South China Sea. The 
opposition to the balance-of-power realism, hegemonic realism, claim that hegemonic powers 
will rise in the international system and will “establish a set of political, economic and 
behavioural norms to manage the international system, a concentration of power thereby 
bringing stability to the system”151. Liu and Zhang claim that as a power rise as a hegemonic 
power there will be wars between the new power and the old hegemonic power, before 
stability is restored through transition of power
152
. The political disagreements between China 
and the Southeast Asian states might lead to war, but China will rise as the great power in the 
region and then provide stability to the area. As China grows in power the hegemonic realists 
anticipate a war between China and the U.S. for power in the Asia-Pacific. One of China’s 
first hegemonic conquests might be the control over the South China Sea. The liberalist’s 
theories might hold if other sources of energy are found. However, if the need for oil 
continues to rise at the same rate it has done in the recent years, confrontations between major 
powers to secure access to the remaining oil supplies are inevitable.     
 
3.4.1. Disputes in the South China Sea  
There have been several disputes between the littoral states of the South China Sea. Rich in 
natural resources, the South China Sea is also strategically very important. The country or 
countries which control the South China Sea controls the eastern access to the Straits of 
Malacca.  
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Figure 4: Map over the South China Sea with the Spratly Islands   
 
By applying anti-access challenges to this strategic area, the dominating power will hinder 
free flow of commerce and can threaten security in the region. The Philippines, Brunei, 
Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan, Vietnam and China all lay claims to large parts of the South 
China Sea. Most of these claims can in theory be met by extensions of the Exclusive 
Economic Zones since most of the littoral states only claim partial expansions of their sea 
boundaries. China, however, lays claim to almost the entire South China Sea. Despite the fact 
that China only has the northern shore line of the South China Sea, China claims almost all of 
the sea down to the island of Borneo. The Chinese claims all of the Philippine and Brunei’s 
maritime rights (according to UNCLOS) to the South China Sea, large parts of the Malaysian 
and the Vietnamese rights and part of the Indonesian rights
153
.  
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In 2002 the member states of ASEAN and China all agreed on a “Declaration on the Conduct 
of Parties in the South China Sea”. The Declaration was made to ease the tension over the 
South China Sea and prevent possible developments of conflicts over resources and territory. 
According to the Declaration, the ASEAN countries and China recognize the rulings of 
UNCLOS. They also stated that all territorial and jurisdictional disputes are to be settled by 
peaceful means and that they shall cooperate and develop trust between and among each other 
in all matters concerning the South China Sea
154
. In 2011, however, China is still claiming 
most of the South China Sea as Chinese territory. Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs, Cui 
Tiankai, told visiting US officials in March 2010 that China considered the South China Sea 
one of China’s “core interests”. “Core interest” is also the words used by the Chinese when 
describing Tibet and Taiwan. In a press conference in July 2010, Chinese Defence Ministry 
spokesman Geng Yansheng stated that China had “indisputable sovereignty” over the South 
China Sea and the islands in it. Though Geng assured that ships and aircrafts form “relevant 
countries” would be allowed to travel in the area, he also said that “We (China) are against 
internationalization of the South China Sea issue”155.  
In 2005 Mokhzani Zubir and Mohd Nizam Basiron wrote a paper on behalf of the Maritime 
Institute of Malaysia where the U.S. security interest in the Straits of Malacca and the South 
China Sea was presented as an attempt to control the SLOCs which China depends on. By 
controlling these SLOCs the U.S. can control the economic growth in China and hinder a 
Chinese challenge “to the U.S.’s global leadership in the future”156. Zubir and Basiron refer to 
a Chinese Professor, Ji Guoxing, who states that “China is not interested in expanding its 
influence or in establishing hegemony in the South China Sea and Southeast Asia. China, 
however, is concerned about the security of its southern maritime realm particularly over 
threats from Southeast Asia and the South China Sea”157. It would seem that he claims that 
China, with the largest navy in Asia and most manpower, is concerned about the possible 
                                                     
154
 ASEANsec, http://www.aseansec.org/13163.htm  accessed: 13.01.11 
155
 Global Security, “The South China Sea”, accessed: 09.03.11 
156
 Zubir and Basiron, The Straits of Malacca, pp. 3-4 
157
 Zubir and Basiron, The Straits of Malacca, p. 2 
  
49 
threats from smaller navies in Southeast Asia. Many of the Southeast Asian countries control 
areas which are strategically important in matters of Chinese export and import.  
Vietnam and China have several disputes concerning their boundary in the South China Sea. 
During the last three decades some of these disputes have involved the military and navy of 
both countries and have broken out in skirmishes. In 1974 the South Vietnamese forces 
stationed at the Paracel Islands were attacked by Chinese forces and driven off the Islands. To 
counter this loss, North Vietnamese forces started an occupation of several of the Spratly 
Islands in 1975. Feeling threatened by Vietnam’s successful invasion of Cambodia in 1978, 
China invaded Vietnam the year after. However, the Vietnamese forces managed to resist the 
invaders and China had to withdraw from the occupied areas. During the late 1970s and early 
1980s Vietnam depended upon the Soviet Navy for protection. However, Gorbachev 
withdrew most of the Soviet support from Vietnam in the 1980s, leaving Vietnam vulnerable 
to Chinese forces. In 1988 there was a sea battle between the Vietnamese and the Chinese 
navies at Johnson Reef in the Spratly Islands. During this incident several Vietnamese vessels 
were sunk and over 70 Vietnamese sailors were killed
158
. UNCLOS article 15 states that 
“Where the coasts of two States are opposite or adjacent to each other, neither of the two 
States is entitled, failing agreement between them to the contrary, to extend its territorial sea 
beyond the median line every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points on the 
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial seas of which of each of the two States is 
measured”159. China claims parts of the South China Sea which according to UNCLOS is 
Vietnamese territorial sea. However, China is willing to have this maritime dispute to be 
better able to protect the SLOC through the South China Sea and to be able to claim rights to 
the natural resources in the area. There are still disagreements between Vietnam and China 
over the Paracel Islands and the Spratly Islands, however, the national oil companies of 
Vietnam, the Philippines and China agreed on conducting joint marine seismic activities in 
the Spratly Islands
160
.   
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Early in 2011, China announced that it would focus on more active diplomacy around the 
world. China’s Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi stated that “China’s diplomacy will serve 
domestic interests, especially associated with the country’s economic development”161. It 
seems like China has realized that if China employ an aggressive military posture towards its 
neighbours in Southeast Asia it would probably lead the states of Southeast Asia into closer 
cooperation of hedging against Chinese influence. An aggressive and threatening China 
would also give the U.S. an opportunity to initiate a closer relationship with Southeast and 
East Asian countries. The Southeast Asian countries might also enter a closer strategic 
alliance with India and realize the Chinese fear of encirclement.    
ASEAN will be influenced by the India-Chinese relationship, and will be the area of greatest 
impact in a conflict between the two countries. The countries of Southeast Asia have to plan 
their foreign policies and relations to protect their interests in a region that is going through 
rapid economic and political changes.  
 
3.5. The East China Sea 
The Taiwan Strait is one of China’s main security concerns. Connecting the East and the 
South China Seas, it is only 160 kilometres wide at the narrowest point between the coast of 
the Fukien province in China and Taiwan. The deepest point in the Taiwan Strait is no deeper 
than 70 metres
162
. The Taiwan Strait is not the natural bottleneck the Straits of Malacca is, but 
the tension between Taiwan and China is much stronger than any tension between the littoral 
states of the Straits of Malacca.   
In March 2011 Taiwan’s foreign affairs minister reminded the U.S. of Taiwan’s interest in 
buying F-16C/D jet fighters and diesel submarines. Taiwan states that they are interested in 
solving the problems with China peacefully, but many believe that Taiwan cannot do so 
alone. Timothy C.T. Yang stated that Taiwan needs more weapons and security to be able to 
control the situation in the Taiwan Strait. Yang, a supporter of Ronald Reagan’s “peace 
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through strength” policy, feels that a weak Taiwan will be a natural target for Chinese military 
and naval aggression
163
. The current strategic and military situation ensures that the littoral 
states may test each other and have small confrontations to gain advantages in the area, but 
will stop short of direct conflict. However, PLAN is modernizing fast and may in a few years 
be able to hinder intervention from Taiwanese allies in a future crisis in the Taiwan Strait. The 
key to understand the tension in the East China Sea is therefore to look at the historical and 
turbulent relationship between the littoral states. Taiwan and China have overlapping 
territorial claims in the East China Sea as well as the South China Sea.      
The situation in the East China Sea may become truly unstable if one of the littoral states 
acquired a credible first-strike capability, if that state could be certain that it could attack 
without fear of reprisal. According to both the offence realism and the hegemonic realism this 
will be a likely scenario. China would like to gain control over Taiwan, not because Taiwan is 
an immediate threat to survival of the PRC, but because China sees Taiwan as a natural part 
of China
164
 and would like to control the island. According to hegemonic realism, war is 
unavoidable as the growing power seeks so establish its control of the area. Taiwan is one of 
the largest unsolved issues between China and the U.S.  
 
3.5.1 China in the Pacific Ocean; threats to Japan. 
The relationship between China and Japan has been hostile for a long time. Japan has sent 
several naval expeditions to China through history, raiding and demanding payment from the 
Chinese. Some of the first were made by stateless samurais in the mid-fifteenth century. In 
this period Japan was divided into several states which were at war with each other. The 
samurais from the losing states joined in groups, called Wuo-kuo, and raided the Chinese 
coast. The latest invasion was during World War II when Japan set out to conquer all of 
China. The massive destruction of Chinese cities and the inhuman way the Japanese soldiers 
and scientist treated the Chinese population are still cause of tension and mistrust between 
                                                     
163
 Global Security. “Taiwan calls for U.S. arms sales” 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/taiwan/2011/taiwan-110308-cna01.html accessed: 09.03.11 
164
 Taiwan also sees itself as a natural part of China, but would rather see the Taiwanese government as the 
controlling part.  
  
52 
China and Japan. Much of the tension also comes from territorial disputes over islands in the 
East China Sea
165
.   
In the 1990’s Japan started a new modernization of its military. This rearmament worried 
Japan’s neighbours. Article number 9 in Japans Constitution from 1947 states that Japan shall 
never have war potential. During the Cold War, however, the United States realised the value 
of having Japan as a military ally in the Pacific Ocean, serving as a military buffer zone to the 
Soviet Union and China. A Japanese “Self Defence Force” was set up to deter the Soviet 
Union from expanding into the Pacific Ocean. Japans Maritime Self-Defence Forces (MSDF) 
is tasked with protecting Japanese shores and vital sea-lanes. Being described as Japan’s first 
line of defence
166
, the MSDF has now been equipped with submarines, minesweepers, modern 
destroyers and land-based patrol aircraft unit. To further enable the MSDF to conduct 
international peace cooperation missions, protect Japan’s maritime traffic and secure Japanese 
territory, the MSDF has undertaken several reforms. One of the reforms was designed to 
simplify the command structure of the MSDF. Due to the rearmament and the reforms, Japan 
now has some of the most advanced warships in the world, some of which the MSDF has 
deployed to protect Japanese vessels in the Indian Ocean
167
. However, as James C. Hsiung 
states, the MSDF is a defensive force, not an attack force. If there is an armed confrontation 
between the current Japanese and Chinese navies over the resources in the East China Sea, the 
MSDF will only be capable of defending Japanese interests after the conflict has started. 
China, however, will be able to gain the upper hand through aggressive naval forces
168
. Japan, 
as a U.S. ally, is dependent on the presence of U.S. forces in the Western Pacific to deter 
adversary states. The Japanese MSDF has not got all the equipment, training or tactics to be 
able to defend a role as an aggressor.    
China’s hegemonic and strategic ambitions are made clear through the language of the 
Chinese Navy. The PLAN defence strategy includes several islands and states in Southeast 
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Asia. This defence strategy therefore indicates that China wants the control over these areas or 
close alliances with these states.       
- The First Island Chain.  
PLAN has divided its defence into different zones. The First Island Chain includes 
The Korean Peninsula, The Kuril Islands, Japan and the Ryukyu Islands, Taiwan, the 
Philippines, Indonesia and Australia. These are states China has disputes with in the 
East China Sea and the South China Sea. Australia is the only country in this group 
which China has no immediate maritime disputes with. Several of the countries are 
also allies of the U.S., and PLAN considers the possibility of being hindered from 
reaching the Pacific Ocean if these allies and the U.S. work closely together. 
According to Robert D. Kaplan, a main PLAN defence goal is to build up and train the 
Chinese naval force to be able to hinder the free movement of the U.S. Navy in the 
area between mainland China and The First Island Chain
169
.   
- The Second Island Chain  
The Second Island Chain includes the smaller islands further out. Among these islands 
are Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands which are U.S. territories
170
. The islands 
in The Second Island Chain are outside of Chinese shooting range and PLAN will 
have to stretch out its resources in an attack here. The U.S. moved some 8000 U.S. 
Marines from South Korea to Guam, concentrating much of U.S. power in the Asia-
Pacific here. This power-concentration helps to maintain the current balance of power 
in the Pacific
171
.     
Japan’s strategic advantage will be lost if China gains power in the Pacific Ocean. Japan 
already has to face the North Korean Navy in the Sea of Japan and competes for resources in 
the East China Sea with China, South Korea and Taiwan. A strong Chinese Navy in the 
western part of the Pacific Ocean will be able to enforce a blockade of Japan, cutting off all 
import of vital goods to Japan. However, the U.S.-Japanese alliance ensures that this is an 
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unlikely scenario in the immediate future and it is giving Japan time to prepare possible 
counter measures. Japan also has the possibility to ally with South Korea, India, Australia, 
Taiwan and the ASEAN countries to hedge against Chinese expansionism and to make sure 
the balance of power remain in Japan’s favour. China also distrusts Japan because of the 
historical enmity, the alliance with the U.S. and the possibility that Japan might cooperate 
with India in strategic issues like blocking Chinese SLOCs.    
 
How Chinese bases in Burma will affect Japan 
Japan is highly interested in China’s activities in the South China Sea, the Malacca Straits and 
the Bay of Bengal. Japan’s industry and economy are dependent on imported oil172, and in 
2001 over 70% of the oil Japan imported went through the Malacca Straits and the South 
China Sea
173
. In 2010 Japan shipped 85% of its imported oil through the Straits of Malacca
174
. 
If China gains more influence and power in the South China Sea, it would threaten Japan’s 
most important sea line of communication. Any change in the strategic situation in Southeast 
Asia will directly inflict problems for Japanese shipping. Japan needs a navy which is able to 
defend its shipping lanes and maritime resources.   
After the major earthquake and tsunami of northern Japan in early March 2011, several of the 
Japanese nuclear reactors were severely damaged. Operations in damaged plants have been 
shut down as workers are trying to repair the leaks. The shut-down has a major influence on 
the electricity production in Japan. The Japanese population were instructed to save electricity 
and the government decided to shut down all electricity for 3 hours a day
175
. The quake, the 
tsunami and the following electricity shortages inflicted damages to the Japanese industry and 
economic growth. To balance the loss of electricity produced by the nuclear reactors Japan 
will have to import more oil and natural gas from other countries, making Japan even more 
                                                     
172
 In 2009 Japan was the world’s fourth largest consumer of oil; China was number three, the European Union 
number two and the U.S number one. Japan consumed 4,363 million barrels a day in 2009. Japan was also the 
third largest importer of oil in the same year. In 2009 Japan imported 5,033 million barrels of oil a day.   
173
 Austin and Harris, Japan and Greater China, p. 292 
174
 Nishihara, “Naval Competition and Confidence Building”, p. 49 
175
 NRK1 news, 14.03.11 
  
55 
vulnerable to changes in the strategic situation in the South China Sea and the Straits of 
Malacca.        
 
3.6 World View, meeting the other major player in the Pacific Ocean  
China’s aggressive maritime actions can be seen as test of other countries and navies in the 
area and to assert Chinese maritime territorial claims. As China’s influence and power in the 
region continues to grow, countries in East Asia and in the Pacific Ocean will have to 
consider the choice on whether to start closer cooperation with China or to gain protection 
from Chinese hegemony by starting a closer political and military relationship with the United 
States. Since the U.S. Navy is the largest and most active navy in the Pacific Ocean, there will 
inevitable be incidents and confrontations between U.S. Navy ships and PLAN ships. While 
the Japan-homeported U.S. Navy aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk (CV-63) was operating in 
international waters in the East China Sea near Okinawa, on 26 October 2006, a Chinese 
Song-class submarine
176
 surfaced approximately five miles away from it, inside of torpedo 
firing range
177
. The USS Kitty Hawk carrier strike group was also denied entry to Victoria 
Harbour in Hong Kong in November 2007, when it was seeking a respite from building seas. 
This and other manoeuvres conducted by PLAN ships, harassing U.S Navy ships in the South 
China Sea, are described by Robert D. Kaplan as “actions not of a great power but of a still 
immature one”178. States which have become “great powers” have had time to develop and 
perfect a “code of conduct” towards other countries. Countries which are still developing and 
modernizing their military and are growing in power might try to project more power than 
what they actually have and test the limits of their political opponents. Ronald O’Rourke, an 
American specialist in Naval Affairs, stated in a Congressional Research Service Report for 
Congress that “decisions that Congress and the executive branch make regarding U.S Navy 
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programs for countering improved Chinese maritime military forces could influence the 
political evolution of the Pacific, which in turn could affect the ability of the United States to 
pursue goals relating to various policy issues, both in the Pacific and elsewhere”179. The 
Chinese Navy may not have the technological capabilities the U.S. Navy has, but the Chinese 
Navy has made enough progress to be able to perform brown-water and green-water missions 
which can cause problems for the U.S. Navy and U.S. merchant fleet and hinder their free 
access to vital U.S. interests in Southeast Asia.  A direct confrontation between U.S and 
Chinese forces is highly unwanted by the U.S., even though the U.S. Navy most likely will 
defeat PLAN. In 2009 the U.S. was China’s largest export partner. 20.03% of Chinese export 
went to the U.S.
180. The U.S. is also the world’s largest borrower. At the end of 2010 more or 
less 50% of the U.S. Treasury debt was held by other states and investors, approximately 22% 
of it was held by China. Roger C. Altman and Richard N. Haass states that if the relationship 
between the U.S. and China came to a crisis over the disagreements over Taiwan, China will 
be able to do more damage to the U.S. by cutting back dollar holdings than by attacks from 
the PLAN
181. As Leslie H. Gelb states “Nations do not fear China’s military might; they fear 
its ability to give or withhold trade and investments”182. However, the U.S. needs to show the 
world that they are capable of and ready to defend U.S. allies regardless encounters with other 
maritime forces. The U.S. would signal weakness if they ended the commitment to Taiwan 
and let the People’s Republic of China unify the two Chinas on PRC terms. Unless South 
Korea and Japan acquires stronger conventional military and nuclear capabilities to hedge 
against Chinese expansion in the region, the U.S. will not withdraw from East Asia.     
The Chinese projection of power when in contact with navies of countries of considerable 
strength today strongly resembles the way China reacted towards other navies in the early 
years of the Cold War. The main Chinese goals are to demonstrate Chinese power, reduce 
U.S., especially, and other countries’ dominance in Chinese spheres of interests and limit the 
potential of other states to block Chinese SLOCs.  
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The so called “String of Pearls” theory is the same theory the U.S. has used to secure U.S. 
interests. Since the Second World War the U.S. has built more than 1000 military bases 
around the world to support U.S. troops on deployment and U.S. allies. William Pfaff 
questions whether or not this system of bases has been a terrible error, if the system which 
was meant to increase U.S. national security “has actually done the opposite, provoking 
conflict and creating the very insecurity it was intended to prevent?”183. The presence of bases 
overseas has provoked local resentment and, in some cases, attacks. Osama bin Laden has 
claimed that the attacks on American soil on 11 September 2001 were directly provoked by 
the American bases in Saudi Arabia, which to him were located in sacred territories
184
.   
 
Conclusion 
No matter if China builds bases in Burma or not, the strategic situation in Southeast Asia is 
changing. The East Asian, Southeast Asian and South Asian countries must readjust their 
geopolitics to an economical, political and military expanding China. As the Chinese security 
doctrine is shifting from focus on land to the sea, a large part of Southeast Asia will become, 
or are already a part of, China’s strategic defence plans. As the world’s economic focus is 
shifting to the East, less powerful countries will have to reconsider their strategic alliances. 
The Southeast Asian countries will have to decide if an alliance with China is more profitable 
than an alliance with the U.S. An alliance with China will mean close cooperation and daily 
encounters and let China become the hegemonic power in the region. An alliance with the 
U.S. will give the Southeast Asian countries the opportunity to hedge against Chinese 
influence and balance the power in Southeast Asia. However, even though the U.S. has large 
military and naval bases in the Asia-Pacific it will take valuable time for support to arrive if a 
war should break out. A military alliance with the U.S. will also mean to officially resist 
Chinese interests and the possible loss of a major trading partner. The alliances between India 
and the U.S. and Japan and the U.S., however, may grow stronger. Both India and Japan seeks 
to oppose Chinese dominance in the Southeast Asian region. It is doubtful that China will be 
able to truly challenge the U.S in the Western Pacific Ocean for decades yet, but the growing 
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Chinese Navy will soon be able to cause more trouble for the U.S. Navy in East Asia. 
Through the alliances with India and Japan the U.S. will be able to ensure American presence 
in the region and secure their interests there.       
All coastal Southeast Asian nations compete for strategic advantages and dominance in their 
adjacent waters. If one state should gain total control of the strategic situation it would 
threaten the export, import, economic development and rise and industry of the other 
countries in Southeast and East Asia. The vulnerability of the Southeast Asian SLOCs is the 
reason for much of the tension in the region. China has the largest navy in the region and 
greatest future potential for threatening the current strategic situation in Southeast Asia. The 
uncertainty of China’s agenda and future strategic goals in Southeast Asia ensures that the 
Southeast Asian states maintain their own modernization and rearmament.  
The rearmament and modernization of the armed forces of most Southeast Asian countries 
will influence political agendas and strategic situations in the region. The countries of 
Southeast Asia have different agendas as they seek to gain strategic advantages in the region, 
making international diplomatic and political relations more difficult to negotiate. The 
negotiation of territorial rights is a complex issue in the South China Sea and the East China 
Sea. China is claiming the entire South China Sea, but the other littoral states are not willing 
to cede large parts, much less all, of their territorial rights and strategic advantages in the 
region to China. China’s increasing geopolitical influence and dominance, however, ensures 
that this is an issue which is not easily resolved. There is also the question on how far the 
countries will go in the rearmament to secure their strategic interests. If the states of Southeast 
Asia could be sure of that China is modernizating its forces for defence matters only, the 
tension might be lowered and the stability of the region will be secure. However, the Chinese 
drive for blue-water capablilties shows that China is building an aggressive navy with great 
potential for first stirke capabilities, threatening the security of the Southeast Asian countries.     
By becoming a global super power China will inevitably make new enemies and will have to 
readjust the state’s diplomatic agenda as political and strategically situations changes in 
countries where China is involved. Bases maintained a long way from Chinese mainland 
project power and force that other countries may interpret as major security concerns for the 
independence of their own state. As India’s power is growing there are four blocks competing 
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for advantages in Southeast Asia; China, India, ASEAN, and the U.S. A multipolar system is 
taking form where each block is hedging against the influence of the other three.   
The strategic situation in Southeast Asia will be monitored closely by all states which have 
economic interests and stakes in the region regardless of the level of tension between the 
Southeast Asian states. Commercial interests and economic ties ensure international 
participation in an escalation in maritime insecurity or a worst case scenario of war.   
Burma might be able to avoid being controlled by its larger and more powerful neighbours, 
but its strategic location and proximity to one of the world’s most important SLOC ensures 
that neither China, India nor any of the Southeast Asian countries will withdraw their interest 
in Burma. The importance of this SLOC means that most of the littoral states and other 
countries which depend on it are prepared to use force to protect the shipping through this 
area, whether it is against pirates, terrorist or neighbouring states. Military and naval 
interventions to secure interests in SLOCs will in itself disrupt the free flow of commerce in 
the region and lead to economical crisis in several of the Southeast and East Asian countries. 
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Appendix:  
Table 1: Republic of China (Taiwan) Navy Warships: 
Type                                                    Inventory  
  1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 
Submarines  2 4 4 4 4 4 3 10 
          
Destroyers  20 24 22 7 7 9 9 9 
          
Frigates  10 10 16 21 22 22 22 22 
          
Patrol Craft  51 55 53 63 63 64 42 42 
          
Mine 
Warfare  8 8 16 12 12 12 10 10 
          
Amphibious  28 26 22 15 18 17 17 17 
          
Support  0 13 19 20 20 19 19 19 
 
Source: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/taiwan/navy.htm accessed: 16.03.11 
 
 
Table 2: People’s Liberation Army Navy Warships 
Type                                                              Inventory 
  1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2007 2010 2015 2020 
Submarines*  117 63 48 50 55 62 63 71 78 
           
Aircraft 
Carrier  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 
           
Destroyers  15 18 18 19 24 27 26 25 26 
           
Frigates  31 37 32 40 46 47 47 47 47 
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Guided 
Missile Boats  212 213 222 94 82 111 84 94 94 
           
Torpedo Boats 230 190 120 16 9 9 0 0 0 
           
Patrol Boats  420 440 440 221 233 235 231 221 204 
           
Mine Warfare 136 126 116 92 92 92 92 92 90 
           
Amphibious 
Warfare 
Ships  37 36 36 26 33 37 39 48 50 
           
Amphibious 
Warfare 
Craft  429 401 406 369 349 339 305 305 305 
           
Surveillance  34 42 42 47 45 45 45 45 43 
           
Support  174 166 173 164 155 154 142 140 135 
           
Auxiliary, 
Merchant 
Marine  32 31 33 32 32 32 32 30 30 
           
* SSB Ballistic Missile Submarines, SSN Nuclear Attack Submarines and SS Conventional 
Submarines.  
Source: Global Security at  http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/navy.htm accessed: 16.03.11 
Ronald O’Rourke writes in his CRS Report to Congress that China would have cumulated a 
total of 31 modern attack submarines in 2010, and 32 in 2012. O’Rourke refer to a ONI report 
which states that China has currently six nuclear attack submarines, three nuclear ballistic 
missile submarines and 53 diesel attack submarines. The ONI report also anticipates China to 
accumulate a submarine fleet of approximately 75 submarines in the next 10 to 15 years
185
.  
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Table 3: Japans Maritime Self-Defence Forces 
Type                                                                 Inventory  
  1990 1995 2000 2002 2005 2010 2015 2020 
Submarines  22 18 16 16 16 16 16 16 
          
Destroyers  9 11 13 13 13 13 13 12 
          
Frigates/ 
Corvettes  48 50 44 44 39 34 34 33 
          
Patrol 
Combatant 
Craft  0 3 3 5 9 7 7 7 
          
Mine Warfare  26 33 30 31 34 31 30 30 
          
Amphibious 
Ships  9 10 11 12 14 13 11 10 
          
Training Ships 3 4 7 7 9 9 8 8 
          
Auxiliary Ships*  14 17 17 18 22 21 21 22 
          
*Includes Ice Breakers, Ocean Surveillance Ships, Fast Combat Support Ships, 
etc.  
Source: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/japan/ship.htm accessed: 16.03.11 
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Table 4: Indian Navy Warships  
Type                                                                 Inventory  
                                                                                          
  1990 1995 2000 2002 2005 2008 2010 2015 2020 
Submarines 
N* 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 7 
           
Submarines 
C* 18 19 18 17 16 16 16 17 24 
           
Aircraft 
Carriers   2 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 
           
Cruisers  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
           
Destroyers  5 5 8 8 8 8 8 8 10 
           
Frigates  15 14 8 8 13 13 14 18 24 
           
Corvettes  4 4 4 4 4 8 9 14 20 
           
Corvettes- 
Patrol  22 24 23 24 16 15 15 15 12 
           
Offshore 
Patrol 
Vessels  10 11 9 8 7 6 6 6 6 
           
Seward 
Defence 
Forces   11 11 9 12 18 9 11 15 19 
           
MCM  20 20 18 17 14 12 12 12 12 
           
Amphibious  19 18 19 17 17 19 17 18 35 
           
Fleet tankers 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 
           
Support/ 
MISC 13 16 18 19 19 13 14 14 12 
           
* Submarines N = Nuclear, Submarines C = Conventional     
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   MCM = Mine Warfare  
   MISC = Mine Countermeasures  
Source: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/india/navy.htm accessed: 01.04.11 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: The naval military balance in the South China Sea in 2002. 
State   S C D F MP OP M A 
PRC  57 0 18 35 163 228 119 73 
Vietnam  2 0 0 7 10 34 11 6 
Thailand  0 1 0 19 6 76 5 9 
Singapore  1 0 0 6 18 0 4 3 
Philippines  0 0 0 1 0 67 0 9 
Burma  0 0 0 2 6 28 0 15 
Malaysia  0 0 0 8 8 29 5 3 
Laos  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Indonesia  2 0 0 33 4 37 13 26 
Cambodia  0 0 0 0 0 6 0 0 
Japan  16 0 9 48 3 3 32 6 
Taiwan  4 0 18 21 53 45 12 19 
India  19 1 6 37 8 22 20 10 
Australia   4 0 3 8 0 15 7 7 
          
Key: S: Submarines; C: Carriers; D: Destroyers; F: Frigates; MP: Missile Patrol Ships; OP: 
Other Patrol Ships; M: Mine Warfare Ships; A: Amphibious Ships.  
Source: Figures from Møller, Bjørn, 2002, “The Military Aspects of the Disputes” in “War or Peace in the South 
China Sea”, Timo Kivimäki, ed. P. 78, Copenhagen: NIAS Press   
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